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When considering the preference for redistribution at the individual level, the first thing we notice 
is that people with lower incomes are the ones who say they would like a greater redistribution of 
income. But the way people look at income in general also plays a crucial role. Indeed, if someone 
thinks that income reflects more luck than effort, then they will tend to support a higher 
redistribution. What empirical studies tell us is that demands for redistribution reflect both 
individuals’ self-interest as well as their concern for distributive justice. It should nevertheless be 
pointed out that the intensity of this concern may vary greatly from one country to another. More 
precisely, the study by Corneo (2001) showed that people from countries with high income 
redistribution, such as former West Germany, are characterized by a greater concern for 
distributive justice than people in low redistribution countries such as the United States. Given this, 
understanding the role of the cultural environment in the development of individual preferences is 
crucial to an understanding of demands for redistribution and, by extension, the diversity of 
redistributive policies in democracies, as illustrated in the table below. In this regard, the 
conclusion by Luttmer and Signal (2011) that immigrants from countries with a strong preference 
for redistribution continue to support a higher redistribution in their host country than do natives is 
decisive. It thus seems not only that the intensity of a person’s concern for distributive justice 
depends on the environment in which they are raised, but also that this no longer varies after 
reaching adulthood[1]. 
In the light of these empirical results, I have proposed in a working paper a mechanism for the 
cultural transmission of this moral norm, i.e. the intensity of the concern for distributive justice. 
The paper argues that preferences are a characteristic of an oblique socialization process [2] and 
are structured in part by the observation, imitation [3] and internalization of cultural practices. 
More specifically, my mechanism stipulates that the observation during childhood of excessively 
unfair redistributive policies will result in a weakened concern for distributive justice. The moral 
cost of not supporting a fair distribution of income once a person reaches adulthood is lessened by 
the observation of the collective failure of the previous generation to have established institutions 
promoting distributive justice. In other words, the mechanism that I am proposing reflects the fact 
that having been exposed to too much injustice reduces a person’s capacity to feel concerned 
about injustice.[4] 
As a consequence of the intergenerational cultural transmission mechanism proposed, my model 
allows us to satisfactorily account for the fact that redistribution is greater in Europe than in the 
United States, even though income inequalities before taxes and transfers are lower (cf. Table 1). 
In doing this, I improve on the prediction of the canonical model of Meltzer and Richard (1981), 
who argue instead that greater income inequality should result in greater redistribution. Moreover, 
these differences about redistribution persist over time because they become part of an individual’s 
preferences via the intergenerational transmission of the intensity of concern for distributive 
justice. It is through this same mechanism of the intergenerational transmission of values that we 
can finally explain why immigrants from countries with strong redistribution continue to support a 
higher level of redistribution in their host country. 
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[1] In support of this interpretation, the psychologists McCrae and Costa (1994) showed that 
personality traits were frozen after the age of 30. 
[2] We speak of oblique socialization or transmission when an individual learns from contact with 
people from the generation of his parents or from institutions. Transmission is called vertical when 
it occurs between parents and their children. It is called horizontal when an individual learns from 
their peers. 
[3] In the evolutionary literature, learning from others by imitating them is an economical and 
efficient way of acquiring information that is locally relevant to adaptation. In this perspective, the 
propensities to learn and to imitate are components of a psychology that has evolved through 
natural selection (Boyd and Richerson, 1985). 
[4] Twenge et al. (2007) explained that social exclusion causes strong negative feelings that 
undermine for an empathetic understanding of others and, consequently, diminishes pro-social 
behavior. 
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